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Abstract:  We determine how time delays affect international trade, using newly-
collected World Bank data on the days it takes to move standard cargo from the factory 
gate to the ship in 126 countries. We estimate a modified gravity equation, controlling for 
endogeneity and remoteness. On average, each additional day that a product is delayed 
prior to being shipped reduces trade by at least 1 percent.  Put differently, each day is 
equivalent to a country distancing itself from its trade partners by 70 km on average. 
Delays have an even greater impact on developing country exports and exports of time-
sensitive goods, such as perishable agricultural products. In particular, a day’s delay 
reduces a country’s relative exports of time-sensitive to time-insensitive agricultural 
goods by 6 percent. 
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It takes 116 days to move an export container from the factory in Bangui (Central African 
Republic) to the nearest port and fulfill all the customs, administrative, and port 
requirements to load the cargo onto a ship. It takes 71 days to do so from Ouagadougou 
(Burkina Faso), 87 days from N’djamena (Chad), 93 from Almaty (Kazakhstan), and 105 
from Baghdad. In contrast, it takes only 5 days from Copenhagen, 6 from Berlin, 16 from 
Port Louis (Mauritius), 20 days from Shanghai, Kuala Lumpur or Santiago de Chile.   
  We introduce and utilize new data on trade costs from the World Bank’s Doing 
Business report.  The data are collected from 345 freight forwarders, port and customs 
officials operating in 126 countries.  We use data on the average time it takes to get a 20-
foot container of an identical good from a factory in the largest business city to a ship in 
the most accessible port.   
Our goal is to estimate the effect of time costs on trade volumes.  A standard tool 
is the gravity equation.
1 There are, however, two concerns with the use of a gravity 
equation that we address. The main concern is that the volume of trade may directly 
affect trade facilitation.  The marginal value of investment in trade facilitation is higher 
when the trade volume is large since cost savings are passed on to a larger quantity of 
goods. In addition, many time-saving techniques, such as computerized container 
scanning, are only available in high-volume ports.  Thus, while more efficient trade 
facilitation stimulates trade, trade also generates improved trade facilitation.
2  
                                                 
1 Wilson et. al. (2004) and Nordas and Piermartini (2004) use a standard gravity equation to estimate how 
trade facilitation costs and infrastructure affect trade flows using a gravity model.  They use data on port 
efficiency from the Global Competitiveness Report.  These data are based on perception surveys and may 
not be comparable across countries.   
2 In a related paper, Hummels and Skiba (2004) provide evidence that trade volumes affect the timing of 
adopting containerized shipping and reduce shipping costs.   3
Alternatively, larger trade volumes could increase congestion and lessen the efficiency of 
trade infrastructure. For example, as trade volumes surged in China, the wait time at 
Shanghai’s port expanded by 2 days on average in 2003. As a result, 12 loading berths 
were added in 2004. These considerations make it important to distinguish correlation 
from causation. 
The second is that a country’s trade with any given partner is dependent on its 
average remoteness to the rest of the world (Anderson and Van Wincoop 2003). For 
example, Australia and New Zealand trade more with each other than they would if other 
large markets were nearby.  Studies that do not control for remoteness produce biased 
estimates of the impact of trade facilitation on trade, as remoteness is correlated with 
factory-to-port time delays.  
  We identify the effect of time delays in exporting on trade using a simple gravity 
equation controlling for remoteness, a “difference” gravity equation, a “difference-in-
difference” gravity equation, and by using instrumental variables.  The difference gravity 
equation evaluates the effect of time delays on the relative exports of countries with 
similar endowments and geography, and that face the same tariffs in importing countries.  
Comparing exports from similar countries to the same importer allows us to difference 
out importer effects (such as remoteness and tariffs) that are important to trade. For 
example, we examine whether Brazilian/Argentine exports to the United States are 
increasing in Brazilian/Argentine time costs of trade, after controlling for the standard 
determinants of trade, such as relative size, relative distance, and relative income.
3  In 
addition to controlling for remoteness, the difference specification reduces the problem of 
                                                 
3 We also control for adjacency, language, being landlocked, and colonial linkages.  We do not need to 
control for preferential trading area, as our specification only compares relative exports of like countries 
within a preferential trading agreement.   4
endogeneity to the extent that major differences in the trade facilitation process, which 
result from income and trade, come largely from regional variation.   
  The “difference-in-difference” technique we use compares relative exports of 
time-sensitive goods to time-insensitive goods of similar trade partners. Thus, for 
example, we compare relative Ecuadorian/Peruvian exports of beans and other time-
sensitive agricultural products to Ecuadorian/Peruvian exports of potatoes and other time-
insensitive agricultural products.  The advantage of this specification is that we can see 
whether better trade facilitation encourages more exports in time-sensitive categories on 
the same trade route.
4 The identification problem may still be present if enhanced trade in 
time-sensitive industries leads to better trade facilitation, though this is less likely since 
these products make up a small share of total trade. 
  Finally, to ensure that we identify only the effect of trade facilitation on trade, we 
report the results instrumenting for the time of exporting.  We use the number of 
signatures required to export and to import as instruments. The intuition is that 
administrative costs, such as the extra paperwork required when more signatures are 
required, are important in extending the number of days for export processing, but are 
unlikely to be affected by the total volume of trade.   
  Our estimates imply that each additional day that a product is delayed prior to 
being shipped reduces trade by more than one percent.  Put another way, each additional 
day is equivalent to a country distancing itself from its trading partners by one percent, or 
about 70 km.  For example, if Uganda reduced its factory-to-ship time from 58 days to 27 
(the median for the sample), exports would be expected to increase 31 percent and 
                                                 
4 This assumes that overall exports, as compared to exports of time-sensitive goods, have a more important 
effect on trade facilitation.   5
Uganda would bring itself 2200 km closer to its main trading partners—two-thirds the 
distance from Kampala to Cairo. If the Central African Republic reduced its factory-to-
ship time from 116 days to 27, exports would nearly double. The same effect could be 
achieved if the Central African Republic cut 6200 km from its distance to the main 
markets—greater than the distance from Bangui to London.   
The paper proceeds as follows.  The next section discusses the data.  Section III 
presents the estimation strategy.  Section IV presents the results.  Section V evaluates 
time sensitive products, and Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Data 
Our data are based on answers to a detailed World Bank questionnaire completed by 
trade facilitators at freight-forwarding companies in 146 countries in 2005.
5 Freight-
forwarders are the most knowledgeable to provide information on the procedural 
requirements to trade since most businesses use their services to move their products in 
and out of the country. Globally, 43,000 freight-forwarding companies employ 11 million 
people and handle approximately 85% of foreign trade. Their services range from 
arranging the most appropriate route for a shipment, preparing documentation to meet 
customs and insurance requirements, arranging payments of fees and duties, and advising 
on legislative changes and political developments that could affect the movement of 
freight.
6 
                                                 
5 The World Bank’s Doing Business dataset has 155 economies. However, Afghanistan, Angola, the 
Kyrgyz Republic, Lesotho, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Niger, Solomon Islands, and Uzbekistan did not 
provide data on the time delays in exporting. 
6 This information comes from the International Federation of Freight Forwarders Associations’ (FIATA) 
website.   6
Four main freight-forwarding companies participated in this survey.  Panalpina, a 
Swiss company, provided their offices in 56 countries. Maersk Sealand, of Denmark, 
completed 28 surveys in northern Europe and East Asia. SDV International Logistics, of 
France, completed the questionnaire in 24 countries in west and central Africa. And 
Manica, of South Africa, covered the 10 southern African countries. Independent freight-
forwarders completed the survey in the remaining 18 countries, as well as second set of 
answers in other countries. Overall, 345 trade facilitators responded, with at least 2 per 
country.  This provided an opportunity to compare the answers and, where differences 
arose, seek further clarification. After processing all questionnaires, we conducted 
follow-up conference calls with all respondents to confirm the coding of the data. 
In addition to surveying freight-forwarders, surveys were completed by port 
authorities and customs officials in a third of the sample (48 countries). As ports and 
customs constitute a portion of the exporting procedures, they answered only the relevant 
sections of the questionnaire and provided information on the existing laws and 
regulations governing their activities. This allowed a further check on the quality of the 
information supplied by the main respondents, the freight-forwarders. 
The data are collected as part of Doing Business, a World Bank project that 
investigates the scope and manner of business regulations.
7 Doing Business collects and 
analyzes data in nine other areas, for example starting a business, hiring and firing 
workers, enforcing contracts, paying taxes. In addition to exporting procedures, the trade 
survey covers importing, as well as some specific aspects of trading across borders, for 
example recent measures to improve security and their impact on the time and cost to 
ship cargo. The surveys and data are available at www.doingbusiness.org. 
                                                 
7 The survey was designed by Uma Subramanian and conducted by the Doing Business team.   7
To document the procedures needed to export cargo, and the associated time, 
number of documents and signatures, we describe to the survey respondents a stylized 
transaction. The exporter is a local business (100% owned by nationals), has 201 
employees, and is located in the country’s most populous city. The exporter does not 
operate within an export-processing zone or an industrial estate with special export 
privileges. Each year, more than 10% of its sales go to international markets, i.e., 
management is familiar with all the trading rules and requirements. 
The purpose of defining the exporter is to avoid special cases. In some countries, 
for example, Syria, foreign companies complete additional procedures or require special 
permits to export. In other countries, for example the Dominican Republic, much of trade 
takes place through export-processing zones. In larger and landlocked countries, it is 
necessary to specify the location of the exporter so as to identify the nearest port. 
Assumptions are also made on the cargo, to make it comparable across countries. 
The traded product travels in a dry-cargo, 20-foot, full container load. It is not hazardous 
and does not require refrigeration. The product does not require any special phytosanitary 
or environmental safety standards other than accepted international shipping standards. 
Finally, every country in the sample exports this product category. These assumptions 
yield three categories of goods: textile yarn and fabrics (SITC 65), articles of apparel and 
clothing accessories (SITC 84), and coffee, tea cocoa, spices and manufactures thereof 
(SITC 07). Two other categories, white goods and basic electronics, were considered at 
the pilot stage. As the prices of a container load of these goods differed substantially 
across countries, the two categories were later dropped.   8
The questionnaire was tested on a pilot sample of 19 countries, on all continents, 
across all World Bank income groups and all with Panalpina offices.
8 A revised 
questionnaire was sent to all respondents in February 2005, and they were asked to 
benchmark their answers to January 2005.
9 An expanded questionnaire was sent to the 42 
landlocked countries in the sample. It contained an additional section on transit transport 
and customs clearance at each border, as well as the associated documents, time and 
costs.   
The questionnaire asks respondents to identify the likely port of export. For many 
countries, especially in Africa and the Middle East, this may not be the nearest port. Due 
to high port fees, inadequate inland infrastructure, or problems at border crossings, 
freight-forwarders avoid some ports. For example, Cotonou, Benin’s main port, is seldom 
used due to perception of corruption and high terminal handling fees. Respondents also 
identify the likely destination of their cargo. This serves as another quality check of the 
data, to confirm that this is a viable trade destination compared with the available trade 
statistics. 
The survey then goes through the exporting procedures, dividing them into four 
stages: pre-shipment activities such as inspections and technical clearance; inland 
carriage and handling; terminal (port) handling, including storage if a certain storage 
period is required; and finally customs and technical control. At each stage, the 
respondents describe what documents are required, where do they submit these 
                                                 
8 These are Bangladesh, Chile, Dominican Republic, Germany, Honduras, Italy, Japan, Jordan, the 
Republic of Korea, Latvia, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand and the United States. 
9 The survey is available at 
http://rru.worldbank.org/Documents/DoingBusiness/Methodology/TradingAcrossBorders/Logistics-
survey.pdf.    9
documents and whose signature is necessary, what are the related fees,
10 and what is an 
average and a maximum time for completing each procedure.  
Two examples illustrate the data.  In Denmark, an exporter needs three documents 
(exports declaration form, bill of landing and a commercial invoice) and two signatures 
(one by a customs official and one at the port) to complete all requirements for shipping 
cargo abroad. It takes on average five days from the time he starts preparing documents 
to the time the cargo is ready to sail. In contrast, it takes 11 documents, 17 visits to 
various offices (Figure 1), 29 signatures and 67 days on average for an exporter in 
Burundi to have his goods moved from the factory to the ship.  
Trade facilitation is not only about the physical infrastructure for trade.  Indeed, 
only about a quarter of the delays in the sample is due to poor road or port infrastructure 
– in part because our exporter is located in the largest business city. Seventy-five percent 
is due to administrative hurdles - numerous customs procedures, tax procedures, 
clearances and cargo inspections - often before the containers reach the port.  The 
problems are magnified for landlocked African countries, whose exporters need to 
comply with different requirements at each border.   
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the necessary time to fulfill all the 
requirements for export by region and regional arrangement. Several patterns are seen in 
the data.  Getting products from factory to ship is relatively quick in developed countries, 
taking only 12½ days on average. Countries in East Asia and the Pacific are also 
relatively efficient taking 24 days on average, with Singapore taking only six days.  In 
                                                 
10 Non-fee payments, such as bribes or other informal payments to ease the process are not considered. This 
is not because they do not happen – a separate section of the survey asks open-ended questions on the main 
constraints to exporting, including perceptions of corruption at the ports and customs. However, the 
methodology for data collection relies on double-checking with existing rules and regulations. Unless a fee 
can be traced to a specific written rule, it is not recorded.   10
contrast, export times in Sub-Saharan Africa are especially long, taking 47½ days on 
average.  In addition, the variation across countries in Sub-Saharan Africa is large, 
ranging from 16 days in Mauritius to 116 days in the Central African Republic.   
The time delays reported in the survey are probably at the lower end of the time it 
takes to move the average product from factory to ship. This is because the products are 
chosen so that they do not require cooling or any technical inspections based on use of 
hazardous materials. 
Table 2 presents correlations for the full sample of bilateral trade between the 
time to move goods from factory to ship and other variables included in the regression 
analysis.  Time is positively correlated with remoteness, more remote countries tend to 
have longer times of getting goods to ship.  Time is negatively correlated with per capita 
income, implying that wealthier countries tend to have better trade facilitation. 
The trade data are from the UN Comtrade database.  GDP and GDP per capita are 
from the World Bank’s World Development indicators.  We use data for 2001-2003, 
convert to constant values, and average them in order to avoid idiosyncracies in any 
given year, though results are very similar if we use only data for 2003 (the latest 
available).  Trade data were not available for 20 of the 146 countries for which we have 
data on the time to move goods from factory to ship, so our final sample is the 126 





                                                 
11 The 20 countries with missing trade data for 2001-2003 are Bhutan, Chad, Congo Republic, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, Iraq, Laos, Macedonia, Mauritania, Palau, Puerto Rico, Serbia and 
Montenegro, Sudan, Taiwan (China), Timor-Leste, Tonga, Vanuatu, Vietnam and West Bank and Gaza.    11
III. Estimation 
We study the extent to which the time to move goods from the factory to the ship 
influences the volume of exports.  Longer time delays act as a tax on exports, especially 
on high-value goods, since they are effectively depreciating during the delay.  In addition, 
the exporter must expend capital on the exporting process and storage/transport of the 
goods during the delay.  Finally, long time delays are likely to be associated with more 
uncertainty about delivery times, which would further depress exports.
12 
For comparison purposes, we begin by estimating an augmented gravity equation 
that takes the remoteness of a country into account.  The intuition is that more remote 
countries are likely to trade more with their actual trading partners because they have 
fewer alternatives.  For example, Australia is likely to trade more with New Zealand than 
Austria is with Portugal—even though their other bilateral characteristics are similar—as 
the latter have more source countries to choose among.   
Since this impact is likely to be correlated with our explanatory variables of 
interest, there is a potential omitted variable bias. Indeed, Anderson and Wincoop (2003) 
show that the failure to control for what they call the “multilateral resistance” is a major 
reason that McCallum (2000) found a large border effect in bilateral trade between 
Canadian provinces and U.S. states.  In our case, countries that have more opportunities 
for export may have higher returns to enhanced local trade facilitation, and invest more in 
time efficient means.  In addition, countries in market centers are more likely to 
                                                 
12 The Doing Business data contain information on the maximum time for exporting.  To control for 
uncertainty, we added maximum-time and also maximum-time-less-average-time variables to the 
regression equation.  The coefficients on these variables were not significant when either was included 
along with the average time variable (which remained robust) and coefficients were very similar to those 
reported here when they were included without the average time variable. The correlation between 
maximum time and average time is 0.92. This high correlation means it is difficult to pick up the individual 
effect of uncertainty.     12
experience transit trade between other countries, and therefore will handle higher 
volumes of trade.  Since there are increasing returns in many port services, trade 
facilitation may be more efficient in these areas.  Indeed, the correlation between 
remoteness (as described below) and time delays is 0.40, indicating that more remote 
countries tend to have longer times of processing exports (Table 2). This is even though 
our time measure does not include the actual time at sea. 
We employ two strategies to deal with this problem. The first is to use importer 
fixed effects to capture importer remoteness and include an approximate measure of 
exporter remoteness in the standard gravity regression. We follow Head (2003) and 































where N is the total number of trading partners; Djk is the distance between country j and 
country k and GDP k is country k’s GDP.
13  The advantage of this measure, as compared 
with a GDP weighted distance measure, is that very distant countries do not carry undue 
weight.   
We estimate an augmented gravity regression: 
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13  jj Dist , the internal distance of country j, is measured as the square root of country j’s area multiplied 
by 0.4.   13
where j and k denote exporter j and importer k respectively; Expjk is total exports, αk are 
importer fixed effects; GDP is  Gross Domestic Product, GDPC is Gross Domestic 
Product per capita; Dist jk is the distance between country j and country k; Exp_Time j: the 
required time for exports to take place in country j; Remotej is the remoteness of country 
j; Landlock j is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if country j is landlocked and zero 
otherwise; and D  jk: vector of dummy variables associated with the exporter and the 
importer such as sharing the same official language, borders, etc. We cluster the errors on 
the exporter, since the explanatory variables are at the exporter level and the dependent 
variable is at the country-pair level. 
The explanatory variable of interest is Exp_Time j. We expect that the time to move 
goods from factory to ship is negatively correlated with the volume of exports.  Importer 
fixed effects control for the extent to which the importer is isolated from the rest of the 
world.  Remoteness captures the isolation of the exporter.  This reduces but does not 
eliminate the omitted variable bias. 
Our preferred strategy is to estimate a simple difference gravity equation on similar 
exporters:
 14 
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where  ik D  is a vector of control indicator variables, such as colony, language, and 
landlocked, associated with the exporters.
15  The dependent variable is composed of two 
                                                 
14 A simple difference gravity regression and a difference-in-difference gravity regression are used by 
Hanson and Xiang (2004) to study the home-market effect.  Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) use a simple 
difference gravity specification to study the role of security in international trade.    14
export values with  lk Exp  denoting exports of country l to country k.  If time does matter 
we expect that the coefficient estimate on  j Time Export _ / h Time Export _  to be negative, 
meaning that countries associated with higher relative time delays have lower relative 
exports.  Errors are adjusted for clustering on exporter pairs, since each exporter pair will 
be associated with a numerous importers. 
The estimating strategy depends on choosing exporters that are similar (in 
location and factor endowments) and face the same trade barriers in foreign markets, for 
example, comparing exports from Argentina to Brazil with exports from Uruguay to 
Brazil. Therefore we use 18 regional trade agreements among 98 exporter countries, and 
consider all cases where two countries in a trade agreement export to the same importer 
(Table A2). As a further robustness check, we eliminate country pairs that do not fall into 
the same of four World Bank income classifications.
16 This ensures that we are not 
comparing countries at different levels of development, such as Mexico and the United 
States or Singapore and Cambodia, but reduces the sample.   
This strategy eliminates the need to control for multilateral resistance on the 
importer side since we compare only imports to the same country.  It also reduces the 
need to control for exporter remoteness because we are comparing proximate exporters. 
Endogeneity is reduced because effects of trade volumes on time are likely to be much 
smaller between similar countries in the same geographical region—for example, we are 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 Thus, it is one (negative one) if the associated dummy in the numerator country is one (zero) and the 
associated dummy in the denominator country is zero (one), and zero otherwise.  For example, if the 
dependent variable is Paraguay/Uruguay exports the variable landlocked is one, if it were instead 
Uruguay/Paraguay exports the variable landlocked would be negative one.  Similarly, if it were 
Argentine/Uruguay exports or the reverse, the variable would be zero.  Each country pair enters only once 
in the regression. 
16 Classification by per capita income are as follows: Low-income, below $825; lower-middle income, 
$825-$3,255; upper-middle income, $3,255-$10,065; high income, above $10,065.   15
not comparing countries in East Asia to countries in Africa. Large trade volumes have 
surely contributed to the development of sophisticated port facilities in Singapore and 
other East Asian countries.  If trade facilitation influences trade in large discrete steps, as 
investing in ports tends to be lumpy, our estimation is robust.
17     
The cost of this strategy is that it reduces the variation in the time delays in 
exporting. This is because countries within a preferential trade agreement group are 
similar in terms of tariff and procedural barriers to trade. 
Endogeneity may still be a problem since relatively high export volumes within 
regions may lead to better or worse trade facilitation. To control for the potential effect of 
export volumes on export time, we also report the results using instrumental variables. 
The instruments we use are the required number of signatures for exports the required 
number of signatures for imports. The intuition is that the number of signatures is a 
measure of excessive bureaucracy that slows down trade facilitation, but is not a result of 
shipping volumes, such as congestion or having containerized ports is likely to be.
18   For 
example with congestion effects, more trade may extend the waiting time for a required 
signature, but it would not affect the number of signatures required.   
 
IV. Results 
We start by estimating a gravity equation with importer fixed effects, Equation (1) above, 
using aggregate bilateral data. The results are shown in Table 3. Column 1 reports the 
                                                 
17 There may, however, still be an endogeneity concern if even marginally higher trade volumes encourage 
relatively better trade facilitation or if higher trade volumes lead to congestion effects, extending the time to 
process goods. 
18 A potential problem is that political interests may lobby more extensively for more transparent export 
procedures if exports are large.  In addition, the number of signatures may be related to the overall business 
climate, which may affect exports.   16
results of a standard gravity equation with importer fixed effects.  The gravity model 
performs well for aggregate data as all coefficient estimates are of expected sign, and the 
model explains 71 percent of variation in the data. The volume of aggregate bilateral 
exports is increasing in GDP of the exporter and decreasing in the distance of the 
destination. Sharing borders, common language and being in a colonial relationship in the 
past all promote trade; being landlocked reduces it.  
Column 2 reports the results including the time delays in exporting.  The 
coefficient on time is negative and statistically significant.  The results imply that a 10 
percent increase in the time delays in exports reduces their volume by about 8 percent.   
However, one concern is that the coefficient on per capita GDP switches sign when the 
time to move goods from factory to ship is included. This is likely the result of 
multicolinearity, as the correlation between income per capita and Time is -0.61 (Table 
2).  Including remoteness does not change the results (columns 3 and 4).  Column 5 
reports the results allowing the coefficient for developing countries to be different.   
Results imply that the magnitude of the coefficient is significantly higher for developing 
countries. 
Next, we estimate the simple difference gravity regression (2) that addresses more 
precisely the potential problem of omitted variable bias and endogeneity.  The results are 
reported in Table 4 for the full sample of regional-trade-agreement countries and the 
restricted sample, which eliminates country pairs if the two are at different stages of 
development.  The first and fourth columns report the results excluding our export time 
as a benchmark. In column 2 and 5, we include the ratio time, which has a statistically 
significant negative impact on the volume of trade. The coefficient is smaller than in the   17
standard gravity equation and the coefficients on all of the other variables included in the 
regression are stable.  The result implies that a 10 percent saving of time in exporting 
increases exports by about 4 percent. Thus, accounting for differences in exporter 
characteristics cuts the effect in half.   
The median number of days to export goods in the sample is 27, thus a one day 
increase in the median country is equivalent to a about a 1.2 percent increase in trade.  
Given that the coefficient on time is about one-fourth the coefficient on distance, we can 
reframe the effect in terms of distance.  A one day increase in export time is equivalent to 
about a 1 percent increase in distance (1/27*1/4).  The median distance in the sample is 
7000 km, implying that a one day increase in export time is equivalent to extending the 
median distance by about 70 km.   
This result holds when we deal with the potential endogeneity of the variable 
ratio_time by using as instruments the number of required signatures for exports to take 
place and number of signatures for imports to take place.
19 We find that a 10 percent 
increase in the ratio of the required time for exports to take place results in about a 4 to 5 
percent reduction in the ratio of exports to the same destination country.  The coefficient 
on time increases slightly when we use instrumental variables. One explanation is that the 
simple difference specification virtually eliminates the positive effect of trade on trade 
facilitation, as this effect works largely across regions.  In addition, using signatures as 
instruments picks up the administrative costs associated with export times, and the 
elasticities with respect to these may be greater than with respect to overall time.   
Table 5 reports results allowing developing countries to have different coefficients 
on export time. The coefficient on time delays in developing countries is significantly 
                                                 
19 Coefficient estimates are very similar when we use each instrument independently.   18
different from that for developed countries. This remains true even when we instrument. 
The results imply that a 10 percent increase in export time reduces developing country 
exports by 8-12 percent.   
One drawback using relative bilateral exports is that we eliminate country pairs 
which export to different locations.  In addition, the main variable of interest is the ratio 
of time which varies only at the country-pair level.  As an additional robustness test, we 
examine relative exports to the world, which allows us to use all country pairs and all 
exports within the regional groups. The disadvantage is the control group is not as 
carefully defined since we include exports to different partners. The results, reported in 
Table 6 are similar, implying that a 10 percent increase in the time to move goods from 
factory to ship reduces aggregate exports by about 3-4 percent.   
 
V.  Time-Sensitive Exports 
 
Time delays should have a greater effect on the export of time-sensitive goods.
20  To 
examine the extent to which they are hampered, we also estimate “difference-in-
difference” gravity regressions using trade data of products for which time matters the 
most and the least. This specification reduces the endogeneity problem coming from 
reverse causality because the products account for only a small fraction of trade on 
average (5-6% and 0.3-0.4% for manufacturing and agricultural trade, respectively) so it 
is unlikely they have a large effect on establishing trade facilitation processes (Table 7).   
We examine a set of time-sensitive manufacturing and agricultural goods.  The 
three time-sensitive manufacturing industries (SITC 2-digit) are office equipment (75), 
                                                 
20 Evans and Harrigan (2005) show that time-sensitive apparel products are more sensitive to distance than 
time-insensitive products.   19
electric power machinery (77), and photographic equipment (88) (Table 8).  These are 
drawn from Hummels (2001), which investigates how ocean shipping times and air 
freight times influences the probability that air transport is chosen.  Those industries are 
associated with highest positive and statistically significant estimates of the days/rate 
ratio in Hummels (2001). This ratio measures the combined effect of ocean shipping 
times and air freights on the probability of choosing air transport.  Similarly, three two-
digit SITC 2 industries – textile yarns (65), cement (66), plumbing fixtures (82) – are 
chosen as time-insensitive as they are associated with the lowest negative and statistically 
significant estimates of the days/rate ratio in Hummels (2001).
21  
We base our selection of time-sensitive agricultural products on the information of 
their storage life (Gast 1991).  We focus on fruits and vegetables (HS 07 and 08). We 
classify products with a minimum storage life of 3 weeks or less, for example apricots, 
beans, currants, and mushrooms, as time-sensitive agricultural products. Time-insensitive 
agricultural goods are those with a minimum storage life of 4 weeks or longer, for 
example apples, cranberries and potatoes (Table 9).  Since the data are at a very 
disaggregate level, we only use export data of those agricultural products of the most 
important exporters (Table A3).
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21 Time-sensitive products are more likely to be shipped by air, while our measure of time delays is from 
factory to ship.  Much of the time delay in exporting (about 75 percent on average) is due to administrative 
costs, which are nearly identical for sea and air.     20
where m and o denote time-sensitive and time-insensitive industries respectively. We 
estimate gravity regression (3) using disaggregate data of products of time-sensitive and 
time-insensitive industries, and do so separately for manufacturing and agricultural trade.   
The test is essentially whether Ecuadorian/Peruvian relative exports of time-sensitive 
goods are different from Ecuadorian/Peruvian relative exports of time-insensitive goods. 
The advantage of the double relative is that we are capturing both relative exports of time 
sensitive to time insensitive goods and making sure that the control group is to the same 
importer.  A negative coefficient on relative time implies that an increase in the relative 
time to move goods from factory to ship reduces exports of time-sensitive goods by more 
than time-insensitive goods. 
Table 10 presents the results for time-sensitive manufacturing and agricultural 
goods. The first three columns report the results for manufactures.  The coefficient on 
exporter time is always negative and significant.  Countries having longer required time 
for exports to take place are associated with a lower ratio of exports in time-sensitive 
goods to exports in time-insensitive goods to the same destination. In particular, a 10 
percent increase in the ratio of time is associated with a 2.4 percent reduction in country 
j’s ratio of exports of time-sensitive goods to the exports of time-insensitive goods in 
relation to country h’s ratio.  
Results for agricultural products in the difference-in-difference gravity specification 
are reported in columns 4-6. Because agriculture production depends on climate and land 
area, we also include the ratio of distance from the equator and the ratio of log land area. 
As expected, the coefficient on time is always negative and exhibit robustness across 
specifications. In particular, a 10 percent increase in the relative time of moving goods   21
from factory to ship reduces relative exports of time sensitive goods by 6 percent. The 
coefficient estimate on distance is not significant—indicating that domestic restrictions 
are a bigger constraint to trade in time-sensitive agricultural goods than distance.   
Poor trade facilitation affects the composition of trade, preventing countries from 
exporting time-sensitive goods.  Time-sensitive goods also tend to have higher value, 
implying that some of the effect of time delays on aggregate exports results from 
countries with poor trade facilitation concentrating on low-value time-insensitive goods.  
Taken together, our results suggest that time delays depress exports, at least part of which 
is due to compositional effects. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
We use a new World Bank dataset on the time it takes to move containerized products 
from the factory gate to the ship in 126 countries.  A difference gravity equation is first 
estimated, by regressing relative exports of similar countries—by location, endowment, 
and facing the same trade barriers abroad—on relative time delays, remoteness and other 
standard variables. Our estimates imply that on average each additional day that a product 
is delayed prior to being shipped reduces trade by at least 1 percent. We find a larger 
effect on time-sensitive agricultural goods: a day’s delay reduces a country’s relative 
exports of such products by 6 percent on average. 
The size of the effect suggests that a one-day reduction in delays before a cargo 
sails to its export destination is equivalent to reducing the distance to trading partners by 
about 70 km. This may explain why Mauritius has enjoyed success as an exporter. At 16 
days to process cargo, the efficiency of its trade infrastructure is identical to that of the 
United Kingdom and better than France’s.   22
Our results have important implications for developing countries seeking to expand 
exports. The recent Doha trade negotiations focused on import barriers in the United 
States and European Union. However, since OECD tariffs are already quite low, 
estimates of increased exports by developing countries from eliminating them are also 
relatively small—around 2-10 percent.
22 For the least developed countries, which already 
have preferential access, the benefits from additional market access are in some cases 
negative.
23  In contrast, our estimates imply that improving trade facilitation can have 
relatively large effects on exports.  For example, in Sub-Saharan Africa it takes 48 days 
on average to get a container from the factory gate loaded on to a ship.  Reducing export 
times by 10 days is likely to have a bigger impact on exports (expanding them by about 
10 percent) than any feasible liberalization in Europe or North America.  
 
                                                 
22 Amiti and Romalis (2005) use detailed data on tariffs and trade volumes, incorporating preference 
schemes, and show that average tariffs on non-LDC developing country products in the U.S. and the EU 
are below 3 percent.  Tariffs on comparative advantage goods are also below 3 percent.  They estimate 
market access gains of 2.28 percent following a 40 percent reduction in tariffs in the EU and US, with no 
exclusions.  Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2005) estimate that world exports would increase 
by about 10 percent if there was complete global trade liberalization. 
23 Francois, Hoekman, and Manchin (2005) estimate an export expansion of 6 percent on average, ranging 
from -8 to 20 percent in poor countries, from full elimination of OECD tariffs.   23
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List of Procedures 
 1  Secure letter of credit 
2  Obtain and load containers 
3  Assemble and process export documents 
4  Pre-shipment inspection and clearance 
5  Prepare transit clearance 
6  Inland transportation to port of departure 
7  Arrange transport; waiting for pickup and loading on local carriage 
8  Wait at border crossing 
9  Transportation from border to port 
10  Terminal handling activities 
11  Pay of export duties, taxes or tariffs 
12  Waiting for loading container on vessel 
13  Customs inspection and clearance  
14  Technical control, health, quarantine  
15  Pass customs inspection and clearance  
16  Pass technical control, health, quarantine  
17  Pass terminal clearance 
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Required Time for Exports 
   Mean   Standard Deviation   Minimum   Maximum  N. of Obs. 
Africa   47.55  21.01  16  116  29 
Developed Countries  12.59  7.09  5  29  22 
East Asia and the Pacific  23.92  15.70  6  66  13 
Europe and Central Asia  32.09  19.08  6  93  22 
Latin America and the Caribbean  29.00  8.66  17  43  19 
Middle East and North Africa  28.40  9.96  10  49  15 
South Asia   32.83  7.47  24  44  6 
Total Sample  30.53  18.61  5  116  126 
          
 
 
Descriptive Statistics by Regional Trade Agreement 
98-country Sample 
Required Time for Exports 




Maximum  No of Obs. 
Andean Community  28.00  7.12  20  34  4 
ASEAN 4  22.67  11.98  6  43  6 
CACM 33.75  9.88  20  43  4 
CEFTA 22.14  3.24  19  27  7 
CEMAC 77.5  54.45  39  116  2 
CER 10  2.83  8  12  2 
CIS 46.43  24.67  29  93  7 
COMESA 50.1  16.89  16  69  10 
EAC 44.33  14.01  30  58  3 
ECOWAS 41.9  16.43  21  71  10* 
EFTA 14.33  7.02  7  21  3 
ELL FTA  12.00  6.00  6  18  3 
Euro-Med 26.78  10.44  10  49  9 
European Union  13.00  8.35  5  29  14 
MERCOSUR 29.50  8.35  22  39  4 
NAFTA 13.00  4.58  9  18  3 
SADC 36.00  12.56  16  60  8 
SAFTA 32.83  7.47  24  44  6 
Total Sample  30.13  19.20  5  116  98 
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Table 2 Correlation of Explanatory Variables 
 
   Export_Time  GDP  GDPC  Remote  Export_Sign  Import_Sign Import_Time Contiguity Language Colony 
GDP -0.225  1                
GDPC -0.611  0.460  1               
Remote 0.404  -0.241  -0.534  1            
Export_Sign 0.796  -0.150  -0.486 0.291  1           
Import_Sign 0.753  -0.160  -0.482 0.283  0.938  1         
Import_Time 0.938  -0.236  -0.630 0.430  0.786  0.778  1       
Contiguity 0.066  -0.012  -0.046 0.013  0.057  0.057  0.063  1     
Language 0.052  0.020  -0.020  0.166  0.049 0.051 0.075  0.120 1   
Colony -0.038  0.061  0.074  -0.072  -0.032 -0.032 -0.044  0.098  0.171 1 




















Standard Gravity Regressions  
Aggregate Bilateral Data -  Sample of 126 Exporters 
Independent Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Time    -0.776 **    -0.801**  -0.708 ** 
   (-20.71)    (-21.26) (-17.27) 
Time_Developing Countries         -0.097  ** 
        (-4.75) 
GDP  1.105 **  1.119 **  1.106 **  1.128**  1.122 ** 
 (108.30)  (110.55)  (105.70)  (108.27)  (105.84) 
GDPC  0.081 **  -0.170 **  0.087
 ** -0.147**  -0.195  ** 
 (6.41)  (-9.47)  (5.78)  (-7.74)  (-8.83) 
Distance  -1.399 **  -1.411 **  -1.404
 ** -1.439** -1.443  ** 
 (-64.68)  (65.95)  (-61.11)  (-63.40)  (-63.49) 
Contiguity  1.192 **  1.200 **  1.184
 ** 1.155**  1.163  ** 
 (11.72)  (11.74)  (11.52)  (11.22)  (11.28) 
Language  0.796 **  0.801 **  0.790
 ** 0.769 
** 0.744  ** 
 (17.67)  (17.95)  (17.16)  (16.92)  (16.19) 
Colony  0.768 **  0.817 **  0.777
 ** 0.862 
** 0.844  ** 
 (8.41)  (8.94)  (8.45)  (9.39)  (9.15) 
Landlocked -0.199  **  0.008  -0.192
 ** 0.056  0.045 
 (-4.56)  (0.19)  (-4.25)  (1.22)  (0.97) 
Remoteness     0.026  0.144**  0.162  ** 
     (0.78)  (4.30)  (4.83) 
          
R
2 0.709  0.719  0.709  0.719  0.717 
No of Obs.  17,949  17,949  17,949  17,949  17,949 
Notes:    (1) T-statistics computed based on the robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on the 
exporter are in the parentheses. * and ** denote 5 and 1 percent level of significance, respectively. 
              (2) Importer fixed effects are included in all regressions.  
  (3) 17,949, the number of observations is equal to the number of positive bilateral export flows of 
126 exporters to 203 importers. 
              (4) Developed exporters are those that have annual GDP greater than $10,065 while developing 
exporters are those that have annual GDP less than $10,065.    29
Table 4 
Simple Difference Gravity Regressions  
Aggregate Bilateral Data – Sample 98 Exporters   
Independent Variables  Unrestricted Sample  Restricted Sample 
    (1) (2) (3) (1) (2)  (3) 
Ratio_Time    -0.380 **  -0.468 **    -0.321 **  -0.331 ** 
   (-6.23)  (-4.98)  (-4.76)  (-3.39) 
Ratio_GDP  1.115 **  1.142 **  1.149 **  1.071 
** 1.099 
** 1.100  ** 
  (38.55) (39.14) (38.29) (30.33) (31.07)  (30.43) 
Ratio_GDPC  0.284 **  0.139 **  0.106  0.699 
** 0.460 
* 0.452  ** 
  (5.46) (2.30) (1.60) (5.40) (3.13)  (2.88) 
Ratio_Distance  -1.375 **  -1.376 **  -1.376 **  -1.416 
** -1.423 
** -1.423  ** 
  (-25.88) (-25.36) (-25.19) (-25.44) (-25.12)  (-25.23) 
Contiguity -0.003  -0.004  **  -0.004 -0.002 -0.003  -0.003 
  (-0.36) (-0.41) (-0.42) (-0.18) (-0.31)  (-0.32) 
Language  0.012 *  0.016 **  0.018**  0.013  0.017 
* 0.017  * 
  (1.71) (2.22) (2.31) (1.50) (1.90)  (1.91) 
Colony  0.100 **  0.103 **  0.104 **  0.111 
** 0.113 
** 0.113  ** 
  (9.40) (8.85) (8.68) (9.90) (9.46)  (9.43) 
Landlocked  -0.499 **  -0.433 **  -0.418 **  -0.437 
** -0.393 
** -0.391  * 
  (-5.38) (-4.82) (-4.53) (-3.62) (-3.32)  (-3.26) 
Ratio_Remoteness  -0.425 **  -0.421 **  -0.397 **  -0.507 
** -0.455 
** -0.453  ** 
  (-5.90) (-4.98) (-4.47) (-5.58) (-5.35)  (-5.28) 
         
Instruments         
No of Required Signatures for              
  Exports and Imports to Take Place       Yes      Yes 
         
Overidentification Test     0.201     0.719 
P-Value     0.6540     0.39634 
         
R
2 in the First Stage      0.5067      0.5797 
R
2  0.4867 0.4917 0.4972 0.4708 0.4754  0.4847 
No  of  Obs.  44207 44207 44207 29717 29717  29717 
         
Notes:    (1) T-statistics computed based on the robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on pairs of 
exporters are in the parentheses. * and ** denote 5 and 1 percent level of significance respectively. 
            (2) In the restricted sample, we only keep pairs of countries that belong to the same group of 
income. The four groups of income are defined as follows: low income group: less than $825; lower middle 
income group:  $825 - $3255; upper middle income group: $3255 - $10065; and high income group: greater 
than $10065.  
  (3) 44027 is the number of exporter pair-importer combinations for which trade data are positive. 
It is noteworthy that we pair only exporters that belong to the same regional trade agreement.    30
Table 5 
Simple Difference Gravity Regressions  
Aggregate Bilateral Data – Sample 98 Exporters 
Independent Variables  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Ratio_Time  -0.321**  -0.221 **  -0.207 ** 
 (-4.76)  (-3.73)  (-3.05) 
Ratio_Time_Developing Countries    -0.555 **  -1.004 ** 
    (-2.61) (-2.70) 
Ratio_GDP 1.099 
**  1.082 **  1.074 ** 
 (31.07)  (30.42)  (29.39) 
Ratio_GDPC 0.460 
*  0.429 **  0.355 ** 
 (3.13)  (2.88)  (2.12) 
Ratio_Distance -1.423 
**  -1.410 **  -1.401 ** 
 (-25.12)  (-24.25)  (-22.75) 
Contiguity -0.003  -0.002  -0.001 
 (-0.31)  (-0.30)  (-0.13) 
Language 0.017 
*  0.016 *  0.016 * 
 (1.90)  (1.84)  (1.84) 
Colony 0.113 
**  0.112 **  0.111 ** 
 (9.46)  (9.61)  (9.59) 
Landlocked -0.393 
**  -0.311 **  -0.236 * 
 (-3.32)  (-2.59)  (-1.79) 
Ratio_Remoteness -0.455 
**  -0.497 **  -0.521 ** 
 (-5.35)  (-5.87)  (-5.94) 
Instruments     
No of Required Signatures for       Yes 
Exports and Imports to Take Place        
and the Interactions of those two        
Variables With Dummy Variables for        
Developed and Developing Countries     
      
Overidentification Test      3.176 
P-Value     0.20434 
R
2 in the First Stage: Ratio_Time      0.7420 
R
2 in the First Stage: Ratio_Time_       
     Developing Countries      0.3657 
R
2 0.4754  0.4778  0.4853 
No of Obs.  29717  29717  29717 
Notes:   (1) T-statistics computed based on the robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on pairs of 
exporters are in the parentheses. * and ** denote 5 and 1 percent level of significance respectively. 
           (2) Developed exporters are those that have annual GDP greater than $10065 while developing 
exporters are those that have annual GDP less than $10065.    31
 
Table 6 
Simple Difference Gravity Regression 
Aggregate Trade Data to the World  
Independent Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Ratio_Time    -0.326
 ** -0.347
 ** -0.437  ** 
   (-4.15) (-3.82)  (-2.96) 
Ratio_GDP  0.976 **  0.994 **  1.004 **  0.999 ** 
 (30.79)  (30.27)  (20.65)  (29.99) 
Ratio_GDPC 0.381
 **  0.274 **  0.572 **  0.238 ** 
 (7.67)  (5.51)  (3.78)  (3.73) 
Ratio_Remoteness 0.100    -0.132
  -0.259  -0.099 
  (0.95) (-0.94) (-1.67)  (-0.68) 
Landlocked  -0.229  0.177  0.261 *  0.085 * 
  (-1.65) (1.62)  (1.90)  (1.77) 
        
Instruments       
Signatures for Exports and          
  Signatures for Imports to Take Place        Yes 
        
Overidentification Test       5.122 
P-Value      0.02362 
       
R
2 in the First Stage        0.4242 
R
2 0.81  0.82  0.79  0.82 
No of Obs  342  342  229  342 
        
Notes:    (1) T-statistics computed based on the robust standard errors are in the parentheses. * and ** 
denote 5 and 1 percent level of significance respectively. 
              (2) Column (3) reports the regression result when we apply the following restriction: we only keep 
pairs of countries that belong to the same group of income. The four groups of income are defined as 
follows: low income group: less than $825; lower middle income group:  $825 - $3255; upper middle 
income group: $3255 - $10065; and high income group: greater than $10065.   
  (3) 342, the number of observations is also the number of pairs of exporters that belong to the 
same regional trade agreement. Specifically, they are: EU: 91; EFTA: 3; NAFTA: 3; ASEAN: 15; CEFTA: 
21; ELL FTA: 3; Andian Community: 6; CIS: 21; MERCOSUR: 6; CACM: 6; COMESA: 45; SADC: 22 
(there are only 22 pairs – not 28 pairs –  because Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, and Zambia belong to both 
COMESA and SADC); EAC: 2 (there are only 2 pairs of exporters  for this three-country trade agreement 
because Kenya and Uganda are members of both COMESA and EAC); ECOWAS: 45; CEMAC: 1; Euro-











Shares of Manufacturing and Agricultural Products in Total Exports 
 
 Manufacturing    Agriculture 
  Treatment Control Treatment Control 
Mean  0.0664 0.0519 0.0038 0.0026   
Standard  Deviation  0.107 0.066 0.007 0.005 
Minimum 0.00023  0.00058  4.96e-06  2.75e-06 
Maximum  0.6293 0.4812 0.0436 0.0332   33
Table 8 
Time sensitivity of products 
List of Time-Insensitive and Time-Sensitive Industries 
SITC  Time-Insensitive Industries  SITC Time-Sensitive Industries 
 
651 Textile  yarn  751 Office  machines 
652  Cotton fabrics, woven (not including   752  Automatic data processing machines and  
  narrow or special fabrics)    units thereof 
653  Fabrics, woven, of man-made fiber (not  759  Parts, nes of and accessories for machines  
  narrow or special fabrics)    of headings 751 or 752   
654  Textile fabrics, woven, other than cotton  771  Electric power machinery, and parts 
 or  man-made  fibers   thereof,  nes   
655  Knitted or crocheted fabrics   772  Electrical apparatus for making and    
656  Tulle, lace, embroidery, ribbons,     and breaking electrical circuits 
  trimmings and other small wares  773  Equipment for distribution of electricity 
657   Special textile fabrics and related   774  Electro-medical and radiological 
 Products   equipment 
658  Made-up articles, wholly or chiefly of  775  Household type equipment, nes   
  textile materials, nes  776  Thermionic, microcircuits, transistors,    
659   Floor covering, etc    valves, etc       
661  Lime, cement, and fabricated construction 778  Electrical machinery and apparatus, nes 
  materials  881  Photographic apparatus and equipment,    
662  Clay and refractory construction materials   nes 
663  Mineral manufactures, nes  882  Photographic and cinematographic  
664 Glass    supplies 
665  Glassware  883  Cinematograph film, exposed and  
666 Pottery    developed 
821  Sanitary, plumbing, heating, lighting  884  Optical goods, nes  
  fixtures and fitting, nes  885  Watches and clocks 
Source: Hummels (2001).   34
Table 9: Time Sensitivity of Agricultural Products 
Time-Sensitive Agricultural Products 
Code Description  Storage  Life 
070200  Tomatoes, fresh or chilled  4-21 days 
070410  Cauliflowers & headed broccoli, fresh or chilled  21-28 days 
070420  Brussels sprouts, fresh or chilled  21-35 days 
070511  Cabbage lettuce (head lettuce), fresh or chilled  14-21 days 
070519  Lettuce, except cabbage lettuce, fresh or chilled  14-21 days 
070521  Witloof chicory, fresh or chilled  14-28 days 
070700  Cucumbers & gherkins, fresh or chilled  10-14 days 
070810  Peas (pisum sativum), shelled or unshelled, fresh or chilled  6-14 days 
070820  Beans (vigna spp., Phaseolus spp.) fresh or chilled  5-10 days 
070920 Asparagus,  fresh  or chilled  14-21 days 
070930  Aubergines (egg-plants) fresh or chilled  7 days 
070951  Mushrooms of the genus Agaricus, fresh or chilled  3-4 days 
070970  Spinach, New Zealand spinach & orache spinach (garden  
  spinach) fresh or chilled  10-14 days 
080610   Grapes, fresh  14-56 days 
080711 Watermelons,  fresh  14-21  days 
080719  Melons (excluding watermelons), fresh   14-21 days 
080910  Apricots, fresh  7-21 days 
080920  Cherries, fresh  2-21 days 
080930  Peaches, including nectarines, fresh  14-28 days 
080940   Plums & sloes, fresh  14-35 days 
081010 Strawberries,  fresh  3-7  days 
081020  Raspberries, blackberries, mulberries, loganberries, 
 Fresh  2-3  days 
081030  Black, white, red currants & gooseberries, fresh  2-28 days 
081050   Kiwifruit, fresh  14-21 days 
Note: We classify those agricultural products as time-sensitive ones based on their minimum 
storage life.  
   35
Time-Insensitive Agricultural Products 
Code Description  Storage  Life 
070110  Seed potatoes, fresh or chilled  120-300 days 
070190  Potatoes other than seed potatoes, fresh or chilled  120-300 days 
070310  Onions, Shallots, fresh or chilled  28-180 days 
070320  Garlic, fresh or chilled  180-210 days 
070910   Globe artichokes, fresh or chilled  120-150 days 
070490 Cabbages,  kohlrabi  60-90  days 
071010  Potatoes, uncooked/cooked by steaming/boiling in   120-300 days 
 water,  frozen  *   
071220  Onions, dried (powder etc), not further prepared  Dried 
071310   Peas, dried shelled, including seed  Dried 
071320  Chickpeas (garbanzos), dried shelled, include seed  Dried 
071331  Beans (Vigna mungo or Hepper…etc), dried shelled  Dried 
071332  Small red (Adzuki) beans, dried shelled, including    Dried 
 seeds 
071333   Kidney beans, including white pea beans, dried shelled   Dried 
 including  seeds 
071340 Lentils,  dried  shelled, including seeds  Dried 
071350  Broad beans & horse beans, dried shelled including   Dried 
 seeds 
071420   Sweet potatoes, fresh or dried    
080111 Coconuts,  desiccated 
080119  Coconuts, other than desiccated 
080121   Brazil nuts, fresh or dried, in shell  Dried 
080131  Cashew nuts, fresh or dried, in shell  Dried 
080211  Almonds, fresh or dried, in shell  Nuts 
080221  Hazelnuts or filberts, fresh or dried, in shell  Nuts 
080231  Walnuts, fresh or dried, in shell  Nuts 
080240   Chestnuts, fresh or dried  Nuts 
080250  Pistachios, shelled or not, fresh or dried  Nuts 
080620 Grapes,  dried  Dried 
080810  Apples, fresh  28-336 days 
080820  Pears & quinces, fresh  60-210 days 
081310 Apricots,  dried  Dried 
081320  Prunes, dried  Dried  
081330 Apples,  dried  Dried 
Note: The list of time-sensitive and time-insensitive agricultural products is chosen based on Gast 
(1991) and the availability of trade data from UN Comtrade Database. Specifically, we eliminate 
classifications to which we can not attribute a precise storage life based on Gast (1991). Examples 
are HS 070610 – Carrots and turnips, fresh or chilled and HS 080420 – Figs, fresh or dried.    36
Table 10 
Difference-in-Difference Gravity Regressions 
Independent Variables  Manufacturing Products  Agricultural Products 
(1) (2)  (1)  (2) 
Ratio_Time    -0.242 *    -0.605 ** 
  (-2.39)  (-3.63) 
Ratio_GDP  -0.037  0.008  -0.669 **  -0.681 ** 
(-0.64) (0.13)  (-3.14)  (-3.00) 
Ratio_GDPC  1.323 **  1.198 **  1.267 **  1.353 ** 
(9.46)  (7.86) (-4.93) (5.22) 
Ratio_Distance  -0.113 *  -0.111 *  0.144  0.121 
(-2.07) (-2.08)  (1.14)  (0.98) 
Ratio_Distance from the Equator      -7.786 **  -9.615 ** 
   (-6.40)  (-5.85) 
Ratio_Land     0.277  0.410  * 
   (1.52)  (2.25) 
Contiguity  -0.519 **  -0.537 **  0.604 **  0.518 ** 
(-8.13) (-8.70)  (4.28)  (4.16) 
Language  0.158   0.187 *  -0.267   -0.289  
(1.76) (2.11)  (-1.86)  (-1.97) 
Colony  0.093  0.115   -0.450 *  -0.213 
(1.03) (1.33)  (-2.33)  (-1.22) 
Landlocked  0.034  0.049  -0.795 **  -0.891 ** 
(0.22) (0.32)  (-3.12)  (-3.75) 
Ratio_Remoteness  -0.345 *  -0.285   -1.410 **  -1.571 ** 
(-2.05)  (-1.79) (-2.74) (-2.81) 
     
R
2  0.0890  0.0916 0.0582 0.0675 
Number of Obs.  1731930  1731930  138565  138565 
Notes: (1) T-statistic computed based on the robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on exporter pairs 
are in the parentheses. * and ** denote 5 and 1 percent level of significance respectively.  
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Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Eritrea, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, 
Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
 
Developed Countries 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United States, United Kingdom  
 
East Asia and the Pacific 
Cambodia, China, Hong Kong (China), Fiji, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines, Republic of Korea, Samoa, Singapore, Thailand 
 
Europe and Central Asia 
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Republic of 
Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Ukraine 
 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, 
Venezuela 
 
Middle East and North Africa 
Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen 
 
South Asia 
Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka 
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Andean Community Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela 
 
ASEAN Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Singapore 
 
CACM El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua 
 
CEFTA Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia 
 
CEMAC Cameroon and Central African Republic 
 
CER Australia and New Zealand 
 
COMESA Burundi, Eritrea, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda 
and Zambia 
 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Moldova, Russia and Ukraine 
 
EAC Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda 
 
ECOWAS Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone and Togo 
 
EFTA Iceland, Norway, Switzerland 
 
ELL FTA Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania 
 
Euro-Med Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey 
 
European Union Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom 
 
MERCOSUR Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay 
 
NAFTA Canada, Mexico, and the United States 
 
SADC Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania and 
Zambia 
 
SAFTA Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka 
 
                                                 
24 There are 7 countries that belong to more than one regional trade agreement: Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Namibia, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia.   39
Table A3: List of Members of Regional Trade Agreements for Time-Sensitive Trade 
 
Manufacturing Trade Data 
 
Andean Community Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela 
ASEAN Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand 
CACM El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua 
CEAMAC Cameroon and Central African Republic 
CEFTA Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia 
CER Australia and New Zealand 
COMESA Burundi, Eritrea, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda,  
Uganda, and Zambia 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Moldova and Russian Federation 
ECOWAS Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo 
EFTA Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland 
ELL FTA Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
European Union Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom 
MERCOSUR Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay 
NAFTA Canada, Mexico and the United States 
SADC Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa 




Agricultural Trade Data 
 
Andean Community Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru 
ASEAN Malaysia and Thailand 
CACM El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua 
CEFTA Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia 
CER Australia and New Zealand 
COMESA Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Uganda, and Zambia 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russian 
Federation 
EFTA Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland 
ELL FTA Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
European Union Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom 
MERCOSUR Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay 
NAFTA Canada, Mexico and the United States 
SAFTA Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka 
 
 